Preface
The growth of "mega-cities" in developing countries is a source of concern. This paper treats a closely related topic, the increasing concentration, through rural-urban migration, of population in "core regions,'' which accounts for disproportionate shares of population and economic activity.
In the industrialized countries a trend toward deconcentration, i.e., net outmigration from core regions, has been evident since the censuses of the 1970s. This reversal of national migration patterns often first asserted itself at a level of development corresponding to per capita GDP of 5,000 US dollars (1985 terms) .
In this paper, Landis MacKellar of the Population Project and D.R. Vining, Jr. of the Population Studies Center of the University of Pennsylvania review evidence from the 1990 round of censuses in less developed countries. While there have been some notable reversals during the last intercensal interval (most notably, net out-migration from the regions surrounding Mexico City and Bangkok), they find that there is nothing inevitable about the commencement of population deconcentration at any given level of development. The share of the core region can continue to grow long after per . capita GDP exceeds US $5,000. This suggests that some LDC urban agglomerations may reach sizes that are astonishing by current standards.
In combining demographic, geographic, and economic reasoning, the paper is typical of IIASA's multidisciplinary research focus. In making available, in summary form, data on population distribution in LDCs during the postwar period, it also reflects the Population Project's continuing emphasis on dissemination and analysis of basic demographic data.
INTRODUCTION
Concern over Third World city growth arises not from urbanization per se, but rather from the spatially unbalanced character of the present urbanization process. As the United Nations Population Division (1993) and others have noted, current demographic trends are rapidly giving rise to "mega-cities" whose absoiute size, rate of growth and exaggerated primacy are sources of concern from the standpoint of economic and environmental sustainability. While policy makers in less developed countries (LDCs) disagree on the consequences of the size and increase of their national populations, they are almost unanimous in condemning its spatial distribution. Thus, most of the LDCs on which information is available in the Population Policy Data Bank maintained by the United Nations Population Division are, or at least claim to be, implementing policies to slow the rate of primate city growth. This paper does not treat directly the "mega-city" phenomenon, but concerns itself with a closely related subject: the continuing redistribution of populations towards "core regions" of LDCs, that is, regions (usually but not always containing the capital city) accounting for a disproportionate share of population and economic activity. Due to urban sprawl and the resulting under-bounding of city administrative boundaries, the population of the core region is frequently a more accurate measure of the size of the primate urban agglomeration than is city size itself.
The standard economic model of population redistribution and development (Alperovitch 1992; Petrakos 1992; Parr 1985; Alonso 1971; Mera 1973) starts with the location decision of the firm in the face of scale and agglomeration (localization and urbanization) economies (Soroka 1994) . As resources, including human resources, are increasingly concentrated in ' the core region, the rate of return to such resources is boosted further, promoting yet further redistribution towards the core. Eventually, scale and agglomeration economies will be exhausted, perhaps in conjunction with diseconomies of congestion and the ecological ill-effects of over-urbanization in the primate city (Richardson 1989; Bartone 1991) , at which point the proportion of the national population residing in the core region will begin to decline. The role of social, cultural and political factors such as ethnic diversity and the distribution of power between core and peripheral regions has also been cited by some researchers (Mutlu 1989; Petrakos and Brada 1989) .
2. THE 5,000 DOLLAR RULE(S) Wheaton and Shishido (1981) estimated a model which suggested rising concentration of urban population into a few primate metropolitan areas, up to a level of national development corresponding to a per capita income level of roughly 5,000 1985 U.S. dollars (USD; as a benchmark, this was approximately the level of income in Korea in the second half of the 1980s -Wheaton and Shishido cited a cutoff of 2,000 1970 USD, which corresponds to approximately 5,200 1985 USD). Citing "a consistent and plausible relationship between economic development and urban concentration," Wheaton and Shishido concluded that the course of population redistribution is entirely predictable: "Urban concentration must increase with the level of development, until the latter approaches USD 2,000 [USD 5,000 in 1985 terms] . After that, spatial decentralization sets in" (Wheaton and Shishido 1981, p. 29) .
Vining and his associates examined, in a series of articles, trends in the distribution of total, not just urban, populations in DCs. They found that in the 1970s, virtually all DCs experienced, for the first time in the historical record, either radically lower rates of net migration towards or actual net migration away from core regions (Vining and Kontuly 1978; Vining and Pal-lone 1982) . Consistent with the rule proposed for urban populations by Wheaton and Shishido, this tended to occur at a per capita GDP level of approximately USO 5,000, albeit with exceptions, such as Japan, in which concentration continued to rise long after national income had reached USO 5,000. Population redistribution trends in the LDCs through the 1980 round of censuses were then examined by Vining (1986) , who concluded as follows:
The basic pattern first observed in Western countries, i.e., of a close association between economic development and population concentration, appears to be being followed in an entirely predictable fashion by non-Western countries.
He added, however, a caveat:
Indeed, the preponderance of the evidence from those countries studied here . . . suggests that only a slackening of the pace of population redistribution pace towards the core can be expected when this level of development [i.e., the inflection point found by Wheaton and Shishido] is reached, not an actual de-concentration. (Vining 1986, p. 18) Nor has the course of population concentration in DCs since 1980 been straightforward (Cochrane and Vining 1986; Champion 1994) : Japan, for example, having experienced population deconcentration during the 1970s, experienced "reconcentration," especially in the Tokyo metropolitan region, during the early 1980s (Tsuyo and Kuroda 1989) . However, Champion (1989, p. 241) concluded frorn nine DC case studies that the "the main weight of the evidence" favored the interpretation that the stalling of deconcentration in some DCs in the 1980s was an anomaly, not the reversal of a trend.
Thus, we have three USO 5,000 rules:
(a) the original Wheaton-Shishido rule, that urban population concentration rises until national GDP reaches USO 5,000, at which point it begins to fall;
(b) ditto for total population; and (c) ditto except that net migration into the core region does not actually turn negative at USO 5,000; it merely declines dramatically.
Of these, it is the second, which is most comprehensive and least equivocal, to which we will refer as "the" USO 5,000 rule. Even in weakened form, the USO 5,000 rule is by no means universally accepted. A plausible optimistic view (e.g., Critchfield 1979 Critchfield , 1981 , holds that the DC-paradigm, in which redistribution trends are driven by agglomeration and scale economies in industry, is inappropriate to those developing countries (such as Bangladesh, China and others) where a dominant rural sector is characterized by rapid technical progress, a good supply of skilled workers and the potfi·hal for reaping agriculture-based : . . :conomies of ~;ca le in transport, communication, storage, research and development, service extension and the like. The combination of lower rural fertility and higher rural incomes in consequence of improved agricultural productivity is, in this interpretation, giving rise to unprecedented rural welfare gains, which will be reflected in diminished rates of rural-urban migration and augmented rates of return migration at per capita income levels far below USO 5,000.
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PAPERS IN REGIONAL SCIENCE, VOL. 74, NO. 3, 1995 Another view, often expressed by researchers at the World Bank (e.g., World Bank 1986), is based on the familiar neoclassical push-pull model of migration and emphasizes the role of price distortions and superior access to amenities, both often grouped together under the rubric "urban bias," privileging the urban population. Thus, many aspects of structural adjustment -devaluation of over-valued exchange rates that favor urban consumers at the expense of rural producers, dismantlement of state agricultural marketing boards with their artificially low purchasing prices, elimination of subsidies in the pricing of urban services and infrastructure and so on -should slow rural-urban migration. Gilbert (1993) attributes the reduction in Third World urban growth rates observed during the 1980s to three factors:
(a) changes in the terms of trade that favored tradeable goods at the expense of non-tradeables, and the switch from import-substituting to export-promoting industrial strategy -this is the bright side of the World Bank model;
(b) recession, the collapse of urban employment and immiseration of substantial portions of the urban population; this is the dark side (c.f., Gilbert 1994); and (c) the transformation of primate cities into more dispersed, polycentric urban forms.
3. NEW EVIDENCE In Table 1 of Appendix A, the LDC census data presented by Vining (1986) are updated through the 1990 round of censuses, and data for many new countries 1re presented. The chosen index of population redistribution is the difference (x 10 3 ) between the core region's exponential population growth rate and that of the country as a whole. On the assumption that core region and national rates of natural increase are equal, this difference is equal to the rate of net migration into the core region. In most LDCs, rates of natural increase are lower in core regions because of rural-urban fertility differentials; the difference between core and peripheral region population growth rates is, however, dominated by the net migration rate.
The net migration rate is a place-specific characteristic; it does not refer to a particular individual behavior and thus does not have the same neat probabilistic interpretation of a mortality rate or a fertility rate. Nonetheless, at the risk of some looseness of usage, we employ the term "net migration rate into the core region" as opposed to more cumbersome alternatives such as "rate of net migration experienced by the core region." Estimates of out-migration rates in LDC peripheral regions, whether obtained indirectly from origin and duration of residence questions on census questionnaires, or directly through population registers or sample surveys, would have the desired probabilistic interpretation; however, these are not available broadly enough to make possible a comprehensive international survey of the sort presented here.
The data source for estimates of per capita income is the 1993 update of the Penn World Table (Mark 5.1) discussed by Summers and Heston (1993) and available from the National Bureau for Economic Research. The statistic reported is inter-censal average income, estimated as the mean of the two endpoints.
Countries previously covered
Countries in which previously observed population redistribution trends continued. New censuses in those countries that were previously covered indicate that significant population concentration continues to occur in Bangladesh (1981-91, per capita income of USD 1,122 during the inter-censal interval), Colombia (1973-85, USD 2,639) , Ecuador (1982 -90, USD 2,968), India (1981 -91, USD 929), Egypt (1976 , Philippines (1980-90, USD 1,810) and Turkey (1980-85, USD 2,956 and 1985-90, USD 3,385) .
Net migration into the core region continues to be almost nil in Ireland (1981-86, USD 7,054 and 1986-91, USD 8,112) and Uruguay (1975-85, USD 3,898) ; and to be modest at a surprisingly low level of per capita income in Tunisia (1975-84, USD 2,334) . International out-migration, which ff,igi1t invalidate the standard economic model of population concentration, is a major demographic factor in Ireland and at least a significant one in Tunisia. The previously observed deceleration in the rate of net migration into the Santiago region continued in Chile (1982-92, USD 3,653) , and Peru (1981-93, USD 2,503) appears to be undergoing a similar process. The population deconcentration that first manifested itself in Argentina at a per capita income level fairly close to USD 5,000 continued (1980-91, USD 4,129) . The long established deconcentration trends in Israel and Sri Lanka, unusual cases whose peculiarities were discussed by Vining (1986) , continued during the 1970s (1972 ( -83, USD 7,358) and 1980s (1981 , USD 2,018), respectively.
The model according to which improvements in rural living standards alleviate migratory pressures early in the development process would seem to be particularly relevant to Southeast Asia, but the evidence is mixed. In South Korea, where the region around Seoul has traditionally exerted an extraordinarily strong attraction, concentration continued in the last two intercensal intervals (1980-85, USD 3,695 and 1985-90, USD 5,238) . In Malaysia (1980-90, USD 4,338) , there is no evidence of a deceleration of net migration into the core region. We were unable to obtain sufficiently detailed census data to present an update for Indonesia (1981-90, USD 1,700 ). It appears, however, that while the growth rate of Jakarta itself decelerated (from 3.4% per year in 1971-81 to 2.4% in 1981-90), population growth in the surrounding areas of Bogor, Bekasi and Tamnggerang was on the order of 5% per year (Hull 1994) . In view of the deceleration of population growth observed in Yogyakarta, and in East and Central Java, due in part to rapid fertility decline and in part to out-migration, it appears safe to conclude that population concentration continued.
Countries in which there has occurred a reversal of previously observed population redistribution trends. In Thailand (1980-92, USD 2,839), the latest census reveals modest net out-}11igration from Bangkok and its environs. This would appear to be a clear exception to the USD 5,000 rule, and it seems plausible that rising environmental costs and disamenities are playing a role.
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PAPERS IN REGIONAL SCIENCE, VOL. 74, NO. 3, 1995 The USD 5,000 rule in its naive form -a decisive reversal of net migration trends occurring at almost precisely the moment GDP passes USD 5,000 -is illustrated by the cases of Greece (1981-91, USD 6,278) , Mexico (1980 -90, USD 5,543) and, less dramatically, Portugal (1981 . In the case of Mexico City, research suggests that deterioration of the urban environment is a contributing factor (Izazola and Marquette 1994) .
Spain (1981-90, USD 8,492 ) exemplifies Vining's weakened interpretation of the rule: the net migration rate dropped dramatically when per capita GDP passed the USD 5,000 mark, but did not actually tum negative (and then only slightly so) until it was on the order of USD 7,500. Taiwan, (1986-92, USD 7,377) may be following a similar path. Panama (1980-90, USD 3,162) and Cuba (1970-81, per capita income not available), where reversals of net migration into core regions occurred at surprisingly low levels of development, may be exceptions to the USD 5,000 rule, but neither is a strong counter-example. In Brazil (1980-91, USD 4,080) , the rate of net migration into Sao Paolo state has fallen into the low single digits, but it was never particularly high. The dominant role of the oil sector makes it difficult to comment on the cases of Algeria (1977-87, USD 2,669) and Venezuela (1981-91, USD 6,389) .
Countries lzere covered for the first time
Countries experiencing population concentration. Leaving aside for the moment.countries in sub-Saharan Africa, very few of which were covered previously, and the small island nations, most recent observations reveal population concentration in El Salvador (1971-921, per USO 1, 599) . All of these cases conform to the USO 5,000 rule.
Countries experiencing deconcentration. The rate of net migration into the core region is extremely low or negative at levels of per capita income far below USO 5,000 in the following new countries: Costa Rica (1973-84, USO 3,193) , Guatemala (1973-81, USD 2,336) , Honduras (1974 -88, USO 1,303), Jamaica (1982 , Myanmar (1973-83, USD 455) , Vietnam (1979-89 , per capita income not available) and Iraq (1977-87, USD 4,615) . Bolivia presents an odd case, having undergone a significant deconcentration during the most recent inter-censal interval (1976-92, USD 1,741) without ever apparently having passed through the concentration phase.
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Jamaica are all small, densely populated countries .. Guatemala and Jamaica also have elevated high rates of international out-migration. Vietnam has a rigorous national population redistribution policy aimed at reducing urban population concentration and developing sparsely populated areas. Moreover, constant definitional changes make data interpretation difficult (Banister 1993) . The case of Iraq is similarly jejune: both military recruitment and attempts to avoid it may have artificially .reduced the population of Baghdad in the 1987 census. This leaves only Myanmar as a new exception to the USO 5,000 rule, and it is not a very compelling one.
Sub-Saharan Africa and the small island states. Sub-Saharan Africa is of special interest: not only is this region experiencing the most rapid expansion of primate cities, but also it is the focus of the "urban bias" model of concentration. Data problems are acute (so severe, in fact, in the notorious case of Nigeria that we chose not to present data for this country), but, since improvements in census accuracy in Africa are greater for peripheral than for core regions, all of the data presented here tend to underestimate actual concentration trends.
Citing only the most recent observation, the data reveal acutely elevated rates of net migration (in excess of roughly 20 per 1,000) info core regions practically across the continent: in Botswana (1981-91, per capita income of USD 2,553), Burkina Faso (1975 -85, USD 477), Congo (1974 , USD 2,099), Ethiopia (1962 -70, USD 271), Gambia (1973 , USD 671), Liberia (1974 -84, USD 925), Mauritania (1977 , Sierra Leone (1974 -85, USD 974), Tanzania (1978 and Zimbabwe (1982-92, USD 1,280) . "Hypermigration" cannot, by definition, continue for very long. As the cases of Zambia (1980-90, USD 816) and Niger (1977-88, USD 560) illustrate, rates of net migration into the core region can decline not only precipitously, but more importantly, to relatively moderate levels.
In most countries in the African region, the structural adjustment process has led to the collapse of formal urban employment and wages, with consequent disappearance of the much vaunted rural-urban welfare gap Gama! and Weeks 1988; Robinson 1990) . The data presented here, scattered though they are, indicate that migration into African primate cities continues apace despite staggering declines in urban real wages, increases in unemployment, public sector retrenchment and so on. To cite only two examples, Jamal and Weeks report that real urban wages in Sierra Leone dropped by over 80% between 1970 and 1986, yet, the already elevated rate of net migration into the Western area actually increased between 1963-74 and 1974-85, from 23.3 to 28.2 per 1,000. In Tanzania, net migration into the Dar es Salaam region proceeded at the brisk rate of 47.2 per 1,000 in 1967-78, a period during which the real minimum wage is estimated to have declined by something like 40%. There has been a further, subsequent drop of over 60% in the 1980s, yet the net migration rate was still 18.9 per 1,000 in 1978 -88. In Ghana (1970 -84, USD 822) and Cote d'Ivoire (1975 , population concentration trends were not particularly extreme even during periods characterized by extreme distortions of the "urban bias" variety. On the face of the matter, then, it appears that "urban bias" is only a contributing factor, not the driving factor behind rapid African urbanization.
Population movements in Sudan (1983-93, USD 1,039) and Uganda (1980-91, USD 707) are dominated by refugee movements. The apparent deconcentration in Mozambique (1970-80, USD 1,177 ) is an illusion caused by the combimtion of improving census accuracy and the civil war. Deconcentration is also observed in Burundi (1979 -90, USD 495), Guinea (1977 -83, USD 391), and Malawi (1977 . The last of these is a possibly interesting case -it may not be coincidental that Malawi has one of the strongest economic and political decentralization policies in sub-Saharan Africa. The small island states present a mixed and not particularly interesting picture. If there is one conclusion that can be elicited, it is that these countries seem to follow no distinctive pattern. Mauritius (1983-90, USD 4,737 ) is an unusual case, but this is not surprising; it, like Sri Lanka, is a perpetual demographic outlier.
GRAPHICAL SUMMARY
In Figure 1 , we plot the net migration rate into the core region (NMR) against per capita income (Y) and draw the least squares line. The NMR is estimated, as described above, by the difference between the core region and national population growth rates. Income data are the Summers-Heston data referred to previously. The least squares line is given by:
034) (-4.399) with R 2 = 0.089, N = 199, and i as the index for the country and t for the inter-censal interval. The pronounced outliers in the plot more or less offset each other, so there is little purpose in deleting them. The calculated x-intercept of USD 7,327 should not be subjected to too much solemn interpretation in view of the mediocre fit On the other hand, nothing in the scatterplot bodes well for the USD 5,000 rule in its naive form. If anything, Figure 1 reinforces a nee~ for caution. The NMR is negatively (albeit weakly) correlated with per capita income; however, it may remain positive after per capita income is well past the USD 5,000 point.
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5. CONCLUSION The experience of DCs in the 1970s and 1980s conformed roughly to predictions of a model that suggested that population redistribution towards core regions would cease at a level of national per capita income of about USD 5,000. Evidence from LDCs through the 1980 round of censuses suggested that the USD 5,000 point was marked only by a slowing of net migration into the core, not by an outright reversal of trend. The body of evidence through the 1990 round of censuses reinforces the need for caution. While there is a weak negative correlation between the rate of net .pligration into the core region and per capita income, the share of population residing in the core region may continue to rise when per capita income is well beyond USD 5,000. Table 1 on the following pages, a highlighted table cell is used to denote new census observations, in the case of countries covered previously by Vining (1986) and to denote countries not covered previously. Unavailable per capita GDP data are indicated by "na" for "not available." A handful of pre-War census observations in Vining (1986) has been dropped.
Every attempl has been made to track down and control for administrative boundary changes; the authors would be grateful to hear from readers who are aware of any changes which they appear to have missed or which have just taken place; ditto new census results as they become available. 
